Forum Discussion
Red Flag in SQL Analytics EndPoint - User Identity Access Mode
We are seeing some red flags when switching the default access mode "Delegated" to ""User's Identity" in a SQL Analytics EndPoint of lakehouse, but seeing red flags with message not relevant to the user who were given access to downstream lakehouse, below is the details.
Current Configuration:
LH1 is in the hub workspace/WS1 with Onelake security role where users were added. In the user workspace/WS2, a shortcut to LH2 the source data is created, user can access through LH2’s SQL Analytics Endpoint, data access mode is switched to User’s Identity, so that source lakehouse's security role control access fully.
In SQL End, there are some red flags as below, but user can access data without issue, which is confusing:
error details: User principal is not supported.
Issue:
Error details is specifically for an AD group which is a workspace contributor role in the source workspace role (default reader of all tables in the source lakehouse), and it doesn't have access to the user's lakehouse.
Question:
Does anyone see the same? or it's a known issue?
3 Replies
- ShivekMaharaj
Solution Sage
Hi stellahe102,
Your follow-up raises an important distinction.
Microsoft's current SQL analytics endpoint OneLake security documentation now explicitly documents a 1:1 identity-mapping requirement for hub-and-spoke shortcut scenarios using User's identity mode.
If a OneLake security role on the producer references Group A, that exact Entra group/Object ID must also have Fabric Read permission on the consumer Lakehouse. Granting access only to individual members of Group A does not satisfy the mapping.
So that explains why LH2's security sync is validating principals originating from LH1.
However, I would check one thing before granting the source Contributor group access to LH2.
If that group is only a workspace Contributor on LH1 and is not actually referenced by a OneLake security role, I would first identify why it is being propagated. Microsoft's OneLake security model notes that Admins, Members and Contributors already receive elevated data access through their workspace permissions and aren't normally dependent on reader roles in the same way as Viewers.
I would therefore inspect Manage OneLake security → Members in role on LH1 and check whether the group appears in DefaultReader, another custom role, or through virtual/default membership.
I would also verify the Entra group type. Microsoft's current SQL endpoint documentation lists mail-enabled security groups and distribution lists as unsupported, and User principal is not supported is also a documented security-sync error for principals Fabric cannot resolve correctly.
From a design perspective, if those LH1 power users should never consume LH2, I would prefer:
- keep them as Contributors on LH1 for their source access;
- avoid including them in the producer OneLake role used for downstream shortcut consumption;
- create explicit source OneLake roles for the actual LH2 consumer groups;
- grant those same consumer principals Read on LH2 to satisfy the documented 1:1 mapping.
That keeps the source administration population separate from the downstream consumption population rather than granting every LH1 user access to the curated Lakehouse.AI-assisted drafting: AI was used to help structure and phrase this response. I reviewed and validated the technical content before posting.
Hi stellahe102,
Thank you for reaching out to Microsoft Fabric Community.
The warning is caused by the source DefaultReader group not being mapped to the downstream lakehouse.
Please grant the same DefaultReader group Read permission on LH2 and then run Metadata sync. Keep the User's identity access mode enabled.
If the warning still appears after the sync, please verify that DefaultReader is a standard Microsoft Entra security group and not a mail enabled security group or distribution list.
Thanks and regards,
Anjan Kumar Chippa- stellahe102
Helper II
Hi v-achippa thanks for your reply! if you don't mind, some follow-up questions:
The DefaultReader group is inherited from the source Lakehouse (LH1) and should not need to be granted access again in the downstream Lakehouse (LH2), as we need to maintain curated access group in the downstream workspace.
From a design perspective, why would central/power users who already have access to the source Lakehouse need to be explicitly added to the consumer's Lakehouse (LH2)?
We also performed additional testing and found that the issue is not limited to AD groups. The error message references any user or group from other business group that has access to the same table in the source Lakehouse (LH1) prior to LH2, we cannot give access to those users who are not intended consumers of LH2
Can you help explain why LH2 validates or checks access assignments that exist in the source Lakehouse (LH1)? What is the relationship between the downstream Lakehouse and the source Lakehouse's user/group permissions that causes those source-level user/group to appear in the error message?